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GLOBAL MARKETS, NATIONAL LAW, AND




Economic liberalization and technological innovations are
changing the dimensions of markets. Both phenomena drive
increasing economic integration in the world, making national
borders irrelevant to global commerce.
As a result, market problems that were once national are
now of international dimension. Many of the problems cannot be
solved by a national-only, or nation-to-nation, horizontal view of
the world. The global patterns of business and market
competition call for a new paradigm for the regulation of
business, one sufficiently copious to view the world as a market.1
Questions of larger-than-national economic governance have
long been treated in the area of trade, particularly in the World
Trade Organization and its predecessor the GATT. As we enter
the new century, similar questions loom with regard to
investment, the environment, labor, intellectual property, and
the conduct and structure of business. Proposed solutions range
from international codes and international economic law, to pro-
active networking of nations and continued pursuit of unilateral
national policies in the interests of the regulating nation.2
t Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University
School of Law.
1 See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down,
and Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781, 1781 (2000) (recognizing arguments in favor
of international antitrust on a higher level than that of any nation); Daniel IC
Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94 AM. J. INTL. L.
478, 478-79 (2000) (requiring policies with global scope with the advent of
international competition); see also Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and
Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L. L. 7, 16-20 (1997) (discussing and surveying various
antitrust options all of which are based on the assumption that the world is a
market).
2 See Spencer Weber Waller, An International Common Law of Antitrust, 34
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In this paper I will argue that economic reality is
diminishing the utility and challenging the wisdom and justice of
the supremacy of the nation-to-nation model. Through the
window of regulating business conduct and structure, I outline
the problems posed by unbending adherence to the national
model, present case examples that demonstrate the limits of
national-based solutions, and propose methodologies for
achieving a broader vision.
The question this paper asks is a question of world economic
federalism: at what level of government or community should
regulation be lodged, in view of dual objectives of promoting
efficiency of regulation for the broader community and serving
the values and choices of the local community? In the European
Union, the challenge has a name-it is called the problem of
subsidiarity. As developed below, the experience of the
European Union has much to contribute to the world
conversation.
This paper looks in the direction of anchoring liberalization
while assuring as much national or local autonomy as possible,
consistent with nations "pulling together" to achieve an open,
productive, unprivileged world market system.
I. THE PROBLEMS
Because of spill-overs, nationalism, and lack of vision,
national law may have a poor fit with transnational problems. 3
There are five particular problems that may call for larger-than-
national conceptions: (1) national law cannot catch all the
conduct that harms a nation's citizens; (2) national law with a
generous reach may regulate other nations' people and
transactions and, as a result, intrude on other nations'
prerogatives and order; (3) national systems of law and
NEW ENG. L. REV. 163, 163 (1999) (noting that the European Union advocates an
international antitrust law, which is opposed by the U.S.); see also, Joel P.
Trachtman, Introduction: The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 33 (1996) (defining international economic law); see generally Joel R.
Paul, The New Movement in International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. &
POL'Y 607 (1995) (summarizing trends).
3 See THOMAS CHRISTIANSEN, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION BETWEEN POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY
(European University Institute Working Paper RSC No. 94/4, 1994); Joel
Trachtman, L'Etat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity,
33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459 (1992).
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regulation tend to clash; (4) nations often lack vision when
problems are larger than their boundaries-we need a broader
view from the top; (5) nations are increasingly inadequate
representatives of people and firms that, though they reside
within their borders, produce, sell, and buy in global markets; as
a result, people and firms that reside outside the borders are
increasingly regulated without a voice.
The problems are intertwined, as may be seen through the
lens of competition law (also called antitrust). In industrialized
nations, competition law has largely succeeded in maneuvering
around the first problem-the practical limits of national law.
With the United States as pioneer in this often controversial
enterprise, nations have developed rules of extraterritorial reach
of national law. Today, extraterritoriality is largely accepted as
a legitimate tool to protect the integrity and security of a nation's
commerce and its citizens by reaching offshore acts, such as
price-fixing cartels. Extraterritoriality of national law cannot,
however, meet the challenge of globalization. 4  First,
extraterritoriality is a tool of mature economies that possess
sufficient power over outsiders to command obedience. Less
developed and developing countries lack the requisite power to
reach and discipline offshore actors that harm them. Second, the
extraterritorial solution is not complete, as nations can insulate
their firms' harmful outbound acts by "acts of state," putting
offenders beyond the legal reach of the harmed jurisdiction.
Third, the extraterritorial solution creates other problems" that
arise from the enforcing nation's intrusion into the domain of
another nation-it provokes rather than militates against
systems clashes.
While the first problem is that national law may catch too
little, the second problem is that national law may catch too
much. It may extend so far as to regulate what people do on
their home territory by means totally inconsistent with their
home regulation. Aggressive extraterritorial law may intrude
upon another nation's prerogatives. If the latter nation is
likewise industrialized, it is likely to fight back, perhaps by trade
war or retaliation. If it is less developed, however, it will take
what it gets.
4 See Eleanor M. Fox, National Law, Global Markets, and Hartford: Eyes Wide
Shut, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 73 (2000).
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As the third problem postulates, in a world of international
transactions and extraterritoriality, systems will clash. In the
absence of trade wars on the one hand or acceptance of protocols
on the other hand, this usually means that the nation with the
most prohibitory laws "wins."
Fourth, as a function of their incentives and powers,
national officials in a globalized world lack vision. When
national or local officials see problems through eyes limited by
political borders, their vision is parochial. A producing state
wants to take what it can get-to use its market power or to
pollute across borders. There is no vision of and for the whole.
Fifth, the nation/state is increasingly a flawed agent for
international bargains. There has been a shift in the tectonic
plates of business.5 The activity of firms has shifted from
national to global environments. Global firms pierce border
barriers with the laser-like speed of e-commerce. Firms look
worldwide for inputs, for production sites, and for markets.
National agencies, in contrast, look down at their bordered
domain. In matters of pre-merger notification and clearance, for
example, each national antitrust agency sees its own interest in
delaying while vetting international mergers (as well as in
collecting filing fees). In matters of trade, trade representatives
and legislators respond to domestic businesses' "need" to protect
"their" markets from low-priced imports. Ideally, the agent for
antitrust should be a citizen of the world in the way that
European jurists are citizens of Europe. But typically, national
enforcers ask: why should we look at harms beyond our national
borders? Why should we count the costs (e.g., costs associated
with a U.S. export cartel or a U.S. merger) to the rest of the
world?
As a result of this orientation, national enforcers in
industrialized countries tend to think of international problems
as national, and solutions as horizontal, unilateral or reciprocal.
Each nation/community acts in its own interest, usually
formulated in the short-term. It may call on a neighbor to help it
out-in discovery of evidence, in enforcement of law or in non-
enforcement of a neighbor's law that hurts "its" businesses. 6
5 See Trachtman, supra note 2.
6 These solutions are called, respectively, positive comity and negative comity.
See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The International Dimension of Competition Policy, 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 833, 836-38 (1994) (defining comity as employed in an
[Vol.75:383
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Perhaps the neighbor will return the favor. There is a failure of
will and incentive to see the problems as overarching, to search
for solutions in the interests of the common good of the greater
community, and to appreciate the reality that we are members of
the world community.
I. PERFECTING A WORLD TRADING SYSTEM
Solutions must be tailored to problems. This paper presents
problem-types exemplified by (1) nation/state regulatory action
that imposes costs on outsiders, (2) systems clashes, and (3)
failure of vision from the top. Reacting to the particular
problems, I suggest avenues for resolution. Each of the avenues
suggests unseized opportunities to perfect the world trading
system.
A. Negative Spillovers from State Regulatory Action
Several situations illustrate the problem of negative
spillovers from private conduct that has been blessed by
government action and that imposes costs on people who have no
voice or recourse. First, I present the problem of the Union
Pacific/Southern Pacific merger, approved in the United States
and harming Mexico. Second, I present a problem of standard-
setting in one community that has the effect of excluding
outsiders with incompatible technology.
1. Union Pacific/Southern Pacific
In 1995, the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads
proposed to merge in a deal that would create the nation's
largest railroad. The two railroads ran side by side across much
of the American West and between the Gulf Coast of Texas and
the Mexican border. The merger would create monopolies or
duopolies in numerous markets.7
In the United States, the Surface Transportation Board
(STB) has the right to approve and exempt railroad mergers and
agreement between the U.S. and E.U.); Brian Pearce, The Comity Doctrine as a
Barrier to Judicial Distinction: A U.S.-E. U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 525,
526 (1994) (defining notions of comity).
7 See David Young, Rail Deal Faces Uphill Grade, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1995, at
CIN (noting that the merger would consolidate control of seventy percent of the
truckage in California, ninety-nine percent in Utah, and eighty-nine percent in
Nevada).
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may do so in the "public interest." The railroads applied to the
STB for approval. They argued that the merger would achieve
more than $700 million in labor, operational, and other savings,
and would enable the merged firm to provide better service. The
U.S. Departments of Justice, Agriculture, and Transportation
argued to the contrary and estimated that the merger would cost
American shippers and consumers $800 million in price raises.
The Surface Transportation Board sided with the railroads
and approved the merger subject to modest conditions,
exempting it from U.S. antitrust laws.8
The potential victims of this decision were clearly Mexican
consumers and shippers. Mexican consumers would bear
monopoly charges on southbound traffic, while Mexican shippers
would bear the cost of monopoly charges on northbound traffic.
Mexico was not, however, a concern of the Surface
Transportation Board.
The merger was consummated. 9  The result was a
deterioration of service and an increase in prices.10 Mexicans
were at the mercy of the new monopolist and had no voice in the
process."
2. Geotek/ETSI
In Europe, in the field of wireless communications including
electronic paging technology, the members of the industry belong
to a group designed to set the technological standards for Europe
and seek their adoption by the private European standards body,
8 Union Pacific Corp., et al., Finance Docket No. 32760, Decision No. 44, 1996
WL 467636 (S.T.B. Aug. 12, 1996), affd, Western Coal Traffic League v. Surface
Transp. Bd., 169 F.3d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
9 See Matthew L. Wald, United States Approves Huge Western Rail Merger,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1996, at D1 (reporting that the railroad merger was
consummated with the approval of the Surface Transportation Board).
10 See John Schmeltzer, Railroad Strives to Vindicate Merger; Doubters Still
Stalk Union Pacific Deal, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 2000, at C1 (noting that service
deteriorated and prices rose); Allen R. Myerson, Union Pacific Halts Some Traffic to
Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at D4 (discussing some of the problems
encountered following Union Pacific's acquisition of Southern Pacific).
11 The head of the Mexican Competition Commission wrote to the Surface
Transportation Board noting the harm to Mexico at the crossing. The Board was not
concerned about the impact of the merger on foreigners. Of course, Americans were
also at the mercy of the monopolist, but they had been heard. See Kevin G. Hall,
UP-SP Plan Prompts Concerns in Mexico Antitrust Agency, J. COM., Aug. 18, 1995,
at IA.
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ETSI.12 Only Europeans may belong to ETSI, and all members
agree to use its standards. A number of the Member States of
the European Union impose the ETSI standard by law. The
European institutions have passed legislation requiring
deployment of a mobile telecom services standard by 2002. The
ETSI procedures naturally favor European Union incumbents.
Moreover, because of network effects' 3 and the fact that other
jurisdictions such as the United States favor competition among
technologies rather than standardization of them, users around
the world gravitate to products complying with the ETSI
standard.
ETSI endorsed a digital standard for electronic paging
equipment. Geotek, an American company that purchased a
company from the United Kingdom, was a forerunner in
electronic paging using analog technology. It was unable to get a
license in Europe to use or convert its technology. The single
European standard became the gateway to world competition.
Geotek currently operates under bankruptcy protection. 14
3. Analysis
The railroad and the digital standards cases illustrate an
increasingly perplexing problem. Action may be taken by one
state that has distinct anticompetitive impacts, and the impacts
may fall disproportionately outside of the regulating jurisdiction.
Indeed, as Geotek claims in the ETSI matter, the official action
may be strategically designed to benefit nationals, (or citizens of
a region) or may have the clear effect of doing so. As a result,
the benefits may fall disproportionately within the regulating
state. Moreover, the outsiders have no voice-they lack a right
of participation in the making of a decision that will have a
major influence on them. Further, the authority that imposes
1 See Peter Grindley & Leonard Waverman, Standard Wars: The Use of
Standard Setting as a Means of Facilitating Cartels: Third Generation Wireless
Telecommunications Standard Setting (C), 3 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POLY 2 (1999).
13 The network is useful and valuable in direct proportion to the (increasing)
number of people using the network. Network effects are therefore a barrier to
entry. While there is no essential difference between a national standard and a
regional standard, a regional standard tends to cover a much larger territory; and
as a result, the number of firms required to use the standard will be greater. The
open and contestable market will be smaller and the exclusionary effect will be
greater.
14 See Grindley & Waverman, supra note 12.
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the regulation or grants an exemption from competition law not
only has the power to stack the deck in its favor, but it has the
power to make the political economic choice for the region or the
world. Under this scheme, the most prohibitory jurisdiction
prevails, while the most open, competitive economy (e.g., the
economy with a bias against government-endorsed standards
and industrial collaboration to set standards) will lose.
4. Solutions
One solution to virtually all of the global-market problems is
regulation at a higher level. This solution, however, has all of
the shortcomings of "higher law," including the questions of who
will decide what the higher law will be, who will apply it and by
what means, how the higher authorities can be held accountable,
and how the law can be changed as necessary to meet evolving
needs. These are daunting problems and they impel us to seek
solutions at a lower level.
There are lessons to be drawn from the modes of regulation
and due process safeguards of both the European Union and the
United States.
a. Lessons from Europe
The European Union takes a cosmopolitan approach to
Member State trade-restraining action in the European internal
market. The States, under the Treaty of Rome, may not hinder
the free flow of commerce from one Member State to the next, in
order to carry out the open-market spirit of the Treaty. Any
regulation must be nondiscriminatory and transparent, and
obstacles to internal market trade must be tightly justified. In
particular, States must not take measures that advantage their
citizens over citizens of other Member States.
Within the European Union, the Community often acts by
framework directive rather than by uniform substantive rules of
law. The framework directive formulates goals and aims of the
Community and leaves to the Member States the duty and
opportunity to implement the directive through legislation of
their choice. Thus, in connection with standards for the
transmission of television signals, the European Union adopted
an Open Network framework, obliging the Member States'
regulatory authorities to provide open architecture and to do so
in a transparent and nondiscriminatory way.
[Vol.75:383
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The European Union's vision transcends the state.
European Union law reprehends and punishes excessive,
abusive, and privilege-granting trade-restraining action by
Member States. The beneficiary is the citizen of Europe. 5
b. Lessons from the United States
Lessons from the United States also help to solve the
conundrum of anticompetitive regulations that "bind" (i.e.,
harms) those that have no voice.
The United States has strong principles of due process. Its
founding tradition condemns taxation without representation.
Case law in the United States highlights the rights of notice,
hearing and participation in the event of standard setting, which
by its nature may be both exclusionary and efficient. Thus, the
Supreme Court stated, in a case in which incumbent industry
members excluded new entrants by packing a standard setting
meeting with cronies that, "The hope of procompetitive benefits
[from private standard-setting] depends upon the existence of
safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process
from being biased by members with economic interests in
restraining competition." 6
The lessons might be extended to fit the international
dilemma. Those who will bear the costs of anticompetitive action
adopted by a nation/state, but who are outside of the jurisdiction
of the state, should have a right to be heard and to participate in
hearings. The competition agency of an affected country should
be heard. As a result, the Mexican Federal Competition
Commission could, in a future Union Pacific/Southern Pacific
case, have a legal right to participate in proceedings concerning
exemption of the merger. In that case, Mexico would have the
opportunity to quantify and present to the Surface
Transportation Board the costs of the proposed action to Mexico.
The United States or Geotek might be accorded a similar right,
with due process, to participate in hearings by a European
standard setting body that may, as a practical reality, be setting
the standard for the world.
But the right of outsiders to be heard and to explain the
15 See Eleanor M. Fox, Vision of Europe: Lessons for the World, 18 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 379 (1994).
16 Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 509 (1988).
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harm to themselves and to their country is a feeble right if the
regulating nation's only incentives and obligations are to act in
the interests of its own nation. This dilemma leads to lesson
three.
c. A Lesson from Economics and Practical Politics-Counting All
the Costs
We must learn and take seriously the lesson that even the
"harming" nation is better off when it stops imposing economic
costs on others-whether by public or private restraints. The
externality is a distortion of trade that tends to create
inefficiencies that radiate throughout the larger community and
which tend to produce retaliation and counter-retaliation,
creating further inefficiencies. What seems, in the short run, to
favor a nation by shifting costs to others, directly decreases the
welfare of the larger community and indirectly decreases the
welfare of that nation.
The phenomenon of the downward spiral is explained in the
following passage from an article, co-authored by this author,
which analyzes the problem in the context of private as well as
public (e.g., trade) restraints, and which offers as a solution a
standard of world welfare (accounting for all costs and benefits
in the affected community) instead of the usual standard of
national welfare:
Past the very short run, retaliatory measures and counter-
measures taken to offset the first nation's distortion of trade
and competition tend to escalate into a downward spiral of
increasing impediments to trade. The prospect and reality of
the downward spiral have been the impetus to agreements
among nations on world trade particularly in the context of the
GATT/World Trade Organization. The message that such
nationalistic games are harmful was first brought home to
nations with regard to government-imposed quotas, tariffs,
voluntary export restraints, and similar impediments. It has
only recently been recognized with respect to government-
imposed non-tariff barriers, including foreign investment
limitations, unreasonably exclusionary standards (e.g., in
telecommunications) and discriminatory procurement policies.
The lesson has not yet been brought home, however, with
respect to private restraints, and (perhaps peculiarly, because
it is government action) facilitation by governments of
restraints by firms within their territory. Yet governments
[Vol.75:383
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quite perceptibly and pervasively facilitate private restraints,
and the costs to the world possibly amount to billions of dollars
a year in lost income. Governments may act in numerous
anticompetitive ways. National legislatures may limit the
coverage of antitrust laws so as not to reach beggar-thy-
neighbour restraints. Executive or administrative decisions
may be taken not to enforce antitrust law where the gain from
harm to foreigners is judged greater than the loss to the
nations' own constituency.
An alternative to the national welfare standard is a world
welfare standard. "World welfare" is used here to mean the
aggregate level of consumer benefits and profits realized by
consumers and firms in all pertinent countries. The case for a
world-welfare standard to guide the two residual areas
identified above-private restraints of international dimension,
and government facilitation of them-seems rather
compelling .... 17
The above point is made solely in economic terms. The same
phenomenon-disregarding the costs that fall on "foreigners"--
has an important moral and social policy dimension as well.
Where a nation regulates business structure or conduct that
harms outsiders but makes its regulatory decisions without
taking account of harm to outsiders, and the nation stands
behind the decision as one entitled to the respect of the world,
the decision lacks legitimacy. Thus, the principle of counting all
costs has an economic, moral, and political policy dimension.
To avoid this problem of narrow or biased nationalism,
world leaders might adopt the following principle to guide their
economic dialogue: when a nation considers regulatory action
that may have unwelcome impacts beyond its borders, it should
provide rights of process to persons beyond its borders, and it
should count the costs and benefits beyond its borders as if all
affected areas lay within its borders.' 8 Only then, especially if
17 See Eleanor M Fox & Janusz Ordover, The Harmonization of Competition
and Trade Law: The Case for Modest Linkages of Law and Limits to Parochial State
Action, 19 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. 15-16 (1995); Wolfgang H.
Reinicke, Global Public Policy, 76 FOREIGNAFF. 131 (1997).
18 Some ask: How can we possibly consider antitrust harm beyond our borders?
First, in cases of world markets, this consideration is a necessary part of the
analysis that regulating authorities must undertake. For example, in the merger
case of Boeing, if it was price-raising, it would affect the world. Data on the buyers'
market would indicate the extent of harm to customers located abroad. Second, a
burden can be put on harmed outsiders to come forward with proof of harm to them.
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the outside jurisdictions and people lack the power to protect
themselves, will the regulatory action be efficient and legitimate.
National law does not reach so far today and statutory
change would be needed. The more national enforcers and
regulators resist taking account of the costs "to foreigners,"
however, the sooner the day will come for international
regulation. Unnecessary international regulation could place the
businesses of the world in straight jackets.
B. Systems Clashes
Nations' different and sometimes conflicting laws often
apply cumulatively to the same transaction. Outcomes can be
different because local market conditions are different. There
are occasions, however, where there is only one market and that
market is the world.
Such was the situation when Boeing, the world's largest
producer of commercial jet aircraft, sought to acquire McDonnell
Douglas, the third largest. McDonnell Douglas had failed to
invest in new generation technology and had a dim future. The
only other competitor in the world was Airbus Industrie, the
European consortium. In connection with the acquisition,
Boeing entered into exclusive supply agreements with the three
large airlines from the United States, tying up some twelve
percent of the world market for twenty years.
The United States Federal Trade Commission vetted the
merger, found no competitive problem because of McDonnell
Douglas' probable inability to compete for next generation sales,
and closed the investigation. The European Union also vetted
the merger but stressed that Boeing would increase its share of
the world market from sixty-four percent to seventy percent. It
found serious competitive problems with the merger of the two
firms (both United States firms with no assets in Europe), on the
theory that Boeing would substantially increase its dominance.
The European Union would have prohibited the merger had
Boeing not agreed to conditions that included dropping the
exclusive contracts and licensing technology that had been
subsidized by the United States government. The settlement
came only after top-level threats of a trade war and accusations
of nationalistic strategies on both sides. 19
19 See Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust Regulation Across National Borders: The
[Vol.75:383
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Boeing is the tip of the iceberg. Many other conflicts have
arisen and will probably arise. Others that have occurred thus
far have usually been less public or less hotly contested than
Boeing. When Europe's commuter-plane manufacturing
consortium sought to acquire its biggest competitor, Canada's de
Havilland, Canada permitted and supported the merger but
Europe prohibited it. When two platinum mining firms sought
to merge in South Africa, South Africa permitted and supported
the merger but Europe prohibited it.20 When two Swiss
pharmaceutical companies planned to merge, Europe cleared the
merger with no conditions, but the United States required the
spin-off of a line of research activity.21
United States authorities normally approve a merger if it
cannot be proven to raise prices. The European Commission
normally disapproves a merger or imposes regulatory conditions
if the merger significantly enhances the market share of a
dominant firm, creates joint dominance, or seriously distorts the
playing field for competitors. Further still, other countries' laws
have different nuances. Most outcomes are the same, but there
is a significant margin of difference. Mergers affect the basic
structure of industry, and the structure of industry within a
nation has historically been a subject of national industrial
policy. Unarticulated national biases may subtly and invisibly
tip the scales in arguable cases. What is to be done?
C. Solutions
Possible solutions include a single set of laws for
international transactions in global markets. This would be
difficult to accomplish, however, and it would be harder yet to
assure administration of the law with fairness and legitimacy.
At the other extreme, nations could insist on the right of
unilateral enforcement as they deem fit in the interests of their
nation, perhaps with bilateral duties of notification,
United States of Boeing versus the European Union of Airbus, 16 BROOKINGS REV.
30 (1998); Boeing Attempting to Sell de Havilland, AVIATION DAILY, July 23, 1990,
at 137.
20 See Case T-102/96 Gencor Ltd. v. E.C. Comm'n, 5 C.M.L.R. 971, 1019 (Ct. of
First Instance 1999).
21 See Ciba-Giegy Ltd., Dkt. C-3725 (consent order Mar. 24, 1997), summarized
at 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 24, 182; Eleanor M. Fox, Extraterritoriality and the
Merger Law: Can All Nations Rule the World?, ANTITRUST REP. 2 (Matthew Bender,
1999).
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consultation, and explanation, as is now the case between the
United States and the European Union and various other
jurisdictions.
The national-interest model is likely not to be sufficient in
this millennium when one nation's merger affects the world. If
nations decide to work towards cosmopolitan principles, a
beginning set of principles for mergers of international
dimension might look like this:
(1) Nations' laws and the underlying mode of analysis should
be transparent;
(2) Nations should apply their laws without discrimination
based on nationality;
(3) Nations should not allow national champion interests to
trump competition interests-they should neither enforce nor
withhold enforcement in the interests of a national champion;
(4) If nations apply non-competition objectives such as
national security or environmental concerns, they should do so
transparently and by means tailored to achieve their ends;
(5) If a nation's law expressly allows a non-competition
trump, the trumping value or factor should be separately applied
after the competition analysis has been completed.22
Even this set of principles may not be enough, however.
What happens when, in spite of the five principles, systems
clash? If there is an interest in countering the state of affairs in
which the nation with the most prohibitory law always prevails,
we may need either higher law or rules of priority. Assuming
that the latter is preferable if workable, we should consider rules
of priority. For example, the right to grant or not grant drastic
relief (an injunction or break-up) might be assigned to any
nation 3 that is "home" to both merging firms and is one of the
largest markets for the product or service. But if any nations
have rights of priority, there will be no legitimacy unless: (1) the
nation with the right of priority counts all costs wherever in the
world they fall, and treats all costs and benefits as if they fell
within that jurisdiction; and (2) harmed persons or nations
outside of the regulating jurisdiction have rights of due process
22 See International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC) Final
Report (2000), available at http:l www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/chapter5.htm.
23 1 use "nation" to include a larger juridical community; thus, the European
Union.
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before the court or agencies within the regulating jurisdiction.24
This proposal is an adaptation to private restraints of the
principles suggested above that harness state restraints.
D. The Lack of Vision From the Top
Lack of vision from the top is a startling missing element in
a world in which national law governs global transactions. The
blinkered vision problem reasserts itself repeatedly.
One set of problems is exemplified by the state of merger
control and pre-merger clearance in the world. This is a problem
of excessive uncoordinated regulation. More than sixty nations
now have merger control laws, and more than forty have laws
that require pre-merger notification (usually cumbersome and
expensive), and a period of waiting before clearance, which may
take five to eight months or more. The threshold for reporting
and waiting are often very low. A small stream of sales into the
nation may trigger application of the nation's law; the merging
firms may have no assets in the jurisdiction. A small country
like Bulgaria or Romania can hold up and possibly abort a
multinational merger, even when the market in that nation is
small and the merging firms together have an insignificant
market share therein. A single multinational merger may be
required to pass through twenty or thirty national merger
systems before consummation. Even if the market is global,
there is no different impact in any nation, and the merger is
being seriously vetted by two or more mature agencies in the
nations that account for the major purchases.25
Despite the large and many nets cast to vet international
mergers, few mergers are challenged because few present
competition concerns. In the United States, approximately two
percent of notified mergers become the subject of enforcement
actions. In Canada the percentage is one and a half percent.
If one were to design an effective merger control system for
the world, it would not resemble the ad hoc, uncoordinated,
24 See supra note 22, at http:/ /www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/chapter2.htm.
25 See supra note 22, at http:// www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/la.htm; Douglas
Ginsburg & Scott Angstreich, Multinational Merger Review: Lessons from Our
Federalism, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 219 (2000); J.W. Rowley & A.N. Campbell, Multi-
Jurisdictional Merger Review-Is it Time for a Common Form Filing Treaty?, in
POLICY DIRECTIONS FOR GLOBAL MERGER REVIEW, A SPECIAL REPORT BY THE
GLOBAL FORUM FOR COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICY (Global Competition Rev.,
1999); see generally supra note 22, at http-/ww.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/chapter3.htm.
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reinvent-the-wheel merger control regimes of today. In addition,
with a view from the top we would not and could not ignore the
less developed world. Demographics and demographic trends,
economics, and justice values, require us to move forward on a
premise of inclusiveness. Bringing the less developed and
developing countries into the core of the world trading system
would enhance both world economic welfare and justice. Thomas
Friedman has written eloquently about the role of global
pressures in squeezing out cronyism and helping to put
economies on a base of merit, not privilege.26 Others have
observed how cartels ostensibly targeted at the third world (and
thus never challenged) are in fact world cartels that hurt us all.27
The ripple effects of monopolistic practices that harm nations
that lack the institutions or the will to fight back are likely to
become large waves on the global ocean. We are, economically
(like it or not), one world.
Furthermore, the world trading system is distorted by
problems of private restraints that re-close opened markets and
undermine the system. Liberal trade law attends to public
restraints. Competition law is left to deal with private restraints.
But competition law is national. National law is not up to the
task of opening foreign markets and countering distant
restraints; indeed, national law may not apply. To make the
world trading system more complete, and to inform the several
sectoral instruments of the World Trade Organization that
already contain competition obligations, we may need to deepen
the WTO's competition competences.
Solutions to the vision-deficit problem are elusive.
Networking of nations on a horizontal plane is important but
may not be enough. We should work multilaterally towards
certain attainable solutions, even while developing deeper,
thicker networks of cooperation. For example:
26 See THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE, GLOBALUTION, ch.
8 (1999).
27 See FR9D2RIC JENNY, GLOBALIZATION, COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICY:
CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND COOPERATION (Competition Policy in the Global
Trading System, Conference Paper, Washington, D.C., June 23, 2000); KEITH N.
HYLTON & MICHAEL SALINGER, TYING LAW AND POLICY: A DECISION THEORETIC
APPROACH (B.U. School of Law, Working Paper Series, Law and Economics,
Working Paper No. 01-04, 2001).
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1. Merger Control-Pre-Merger Notification.
Nations should establish a common clearing house or a
system of mutual recognition of merger filings, available on an
opt-in basis to merging parties. Either a clearinghouse center
could be established to receive and disperse filings to
jurisdictions that file a claim-of-right to receive the notification,
or the jurisdiction of the first filing could have a duty to disperse
the filings to all possibly interested nations. Recipient countries
would be required to accept the filing in the first instance, with a
right to receive codicils for particular, separate markets within
their jurisdiction.28
Nations would be invited to agree not to assert entitlement
to notification unless either the parties have substantial assets
in the jurisdiction or there is a credible claim of harm to
competition in the jurisdiction. Nations vetting the same merger
could be required to coordinate their investigations and analysis.
2. Developing Countries
First, bilateral cooperation agreements should be
multilateralized, to give developing countries protections and
opportunities that they themselves would be unable to procure
bilaterally. Second, nations should extend their laws to cover
outbound cartels; for, of all antitrust restraints, cartel
agreements are the most clearly wrong and harmful, and
developing countries are usually ill equipped to successfully
challenge offshore cartels that harm them. Third, nations
should ratchet back their anti-dumping laws, as a first stage
they could be required to give equal weight to their own buyer's
interests. These laws have particularly harmful effects on
developing countries, whose low-priced exports are blocked from
sales on the merits. Fourth, developed countries should provide
coordinated technical assistance to developing countries, with
special sensitivity to the context and needs of the recipient
28 The merging parties might be obliged to provide a skeleton summary of the
planned merger and a list of all possibly interested nations. These nations would
receive the skeleton notice, and would either be obliged to come forward, prove their
entitlement to notification, and give mutual recognition to the filing, or would waive
their right to participate in pre-merger clearance.
A similar proposal has been made by Judge Diane Wood. See Diane Wood,
International Competition Policy-Convergence / Cooperation? (Cutting Edge
Antitrust Seminar, Feb.18, 2000).
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country, exploring how competition policy can help the particular
country and advising how competition law can be implemented
to its advantage. Most importantly, developing countries should
have voice and be accorded respect in the exploration of
multilateral initiatives.
3. Requiring Open Markets
Within the WTO, nations should be obliged not to close their
markets, or condone the closing of their markets, by artificial
private restraints as well as public restraints. For private
restraints, the law (e.g., competition law) of the excluding nation
should apply, as should principles of transparency,
nondiscrimination, due process, and access to courts. 29 Aspects
of each of these proposals meet resistance in the name of
sovereignty. This resistance will not, I predict, withstand time.
CONCLUSION
In matters of economics and market conduct, we are on a
trend line toward "one world." We can close our eyes and insist
on narrow national solutions, or we can be architects of a more
nearly open, integrated world.
This paper is an attempt to stimulate dialogue on liberal
solutions to the problem of incoherence between national law
and global commerce. It suggests open architecture and the
embrace of principles of cosmopolitanism that would link the
nations and people of the world while giving weighty respect to
subsidiarity.
29 See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Millennium Round, 2 J. INVL
ECON. L. 665 (1999); Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access,
91 AMER. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
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